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ABSTRACT
Machine Learning in general and Deep Learning in particular has gained much interest in the recent
decade and has shown significant performance improvements for many Computer Vision or Natural
Language Processing tasks. In order to deal with databases which have just a small amount of
training samples or to deal with models which have large amount of parameters, the regularization
is indispensable. In this paper, we enforce the manifold preservation (manifold learning) from the
original data into latent presentation by using “manifold attack”. The later is inspired in a fashion of
adversarial learning : finding virtual points that distort mostly the manifold preservation then using
these points as supplementary samples to train the model. We show that our approach of regularization
provides improvements for the accuracy rate and for the robustness to adversarial examples. Several
implementations of our work can be found in https://github.com/ktran1/Manifold-attack.
1 Introduction
Deep Learning (DL) [1] has been first introduced by Alexey Ivakhnenko (1967), then its derivative Convolutional
Neural Networks [2] (1980) has been introduced by Fukushima. Over the years, it was improved and refined in by Yann
LeCun [3] (1998). Up to now, deep neural networks trained upon large labeled data sets have yield groundbreaking
performances at various classification tasks namely in computer vision and speech recognition [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Training
deep neural networks involves different regularization procedures which are essential, especially when only a few
labeled data are available. We present three of those techniques hereafter.
First of all, data augmentation is a regularization technique through the data. It uses either transformations such as
adding noise, translation or generative models, etc, to get more training samples. Mix-up [9], CutMix [10] can be also
classed as data augmentation.
Secondly, the regularization can be performed through the model. The first strategy targets the parameters of the
model. In this category, we find methods such as Dropout [11], Drop Block[12], Batch Normalization [13], Instance
Normalization [14], Layer Normalization [15], Group Normalization [16]... Several models have become standard such
as AlexNet, VGG, GoogleNet and ResNet. The other strategy consists in adding a regularization loss to the objective
function. This regularization can simply be a square loss of trainable parameters of model (Weight decay [17]) or, in the
most cases, an auxiliary loss for a task that differs from the main one. Optimizing the model for both the main loss and
auxiliary loss might help it to learn more relevant features, therefore improving its performance. The auxiliary loss can
contain unlabelled samples, turning the original problem into a semi-supervised learning task. The auxiliary can tackle
different tasks like, for instance, preserving properties of original data into a latent representation or classifying samples
in a self-supervised manner, where annotations are generated automatically [18].
Finally, the regularization might be done to the optimization procedure itself like Early Stopping [19, 20], Adam [21],
Cosine Annealing [22]. A taxonomy of regularization and an evaluation of model effective capacity can be found
respectively in [23, 24].
We develop a regularization based on the mechanism called Virtual Adversarial Training (VAT) [25], which is the data
augmentation combined with adversarial learning. Our approach differs from this work in the generation of virtual
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points: a virtual point is created by linear combination of several data samples, as opposed to one created by adding
noise to a data sample. In more details, given a data sample, adding adversarial noise means that we look for an
adversarial sample only in the locality of this sample. On the other hand, our approach allows us to look for adversarial
samples further in the manifold of data.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we revisit some classical manifold learning methods. In section 3,
we present manifold attack, which introduces the adversarial learning into classical manifold learning. Several settings
for manifold attack can be found in section 4. The numerical experiments are presented and discussed in section 5. We
show that our proposed algorithm helps to improve tasks such as manifold learning (for data visualization), classification
and robustness to adversarial examples. Our conclusions and perspectives are presented in section 6.
2 Manifold learning
Given data set X = {x1, ...,xN},xi ∈ Rn and its embedded setA = {a1, ...,aN},ai ∈ Rd, where ai is the embedded
representation of xi, we note
Le(ai,Aci ),
the embedding loss from a data point (or data sample) versus all resting data points, where Aci is the complement of{ai} in A. We present some popular embedding losses hereafter.
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) [26] :
Le(ai,Aci ) =
∑
aj∈Aci
(da(ai,aj)− dx(xi,xj))2,
where da() and dx() are metrics for dissimilarity measure. By default, they are both Euclidean distances.
Laplacian eigenmaps (LE) [27] :
Le(ai,Aci ) =
∑
aj∈Aci
dx(xi,xj)da(ai,aj),
where dx() is a metric for similarity measure, by default dx(xi,xj) = exp
(−‖xi−xj‖22
2σ2i
)
and da() is a metric for
dissimilarity measure, by default da(ai,aj) = ‖ai − aj‖22.
Contrastive loss :
Le(ai,Aci ) =
∑
aj∈Aci
(
dx(xi,xj)da(ai,aj) + (1− dx(xi,xj)) max(0, τ − da(ai,aj))
)
,
where dx(xi,xj) is a discrete similarity metric which is equal to 1 if xj is in the neighborhood (Euclidean metric by
default) of xj and 0 if not. da() is a metric for dissimilarity measure, by default da(ai,aj) = ‖ai − aj‖22.
Locally Linear Embedding (LLE) [28]:
Le(ai,Aci ) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥ai −
∑
aj∈Aci
λijaj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
,
where λij are determined by optimizing the following problem :
min
∥∥∥∥∥∥xi −
∑
j
λijxj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
,
subject to :

∑
j
λij = 1, if xj ∈ knn(xi),
λij = 0 if not.
where knn(xi) means the set that contains k nearest neighbors of xi.
Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (SNE) [29]:
Le(ai,Aci ) =
∑
aj∈Aci
Pij log
Pij
Qij
,
2
where Pij =
dx(xi,xj)∑
k 6=i dx(xi,xk)
and Qij =
da(ai,aj)∑
k 6=i da(ai,ak)
, dx and da are both similarity metric.
Finally, the embedding problem is defined as:
min
A
Lt = minA
∑
i
Le(ai,Aci )
Note that, for LE and LLE, some supplement constrains are required to avoid a trivial solution (all embedded points are
collapsed into only one point). There are two types of manifold learning techniques: with mapping model such as SNE
and without mapping model such as LE and LLE. A mapping model here is a function g() with trainable parameters that
maps a sample x to its embedded representation a as a = g(x). For manifold learning with model, the loss function
Lt is optimized by considering trainable parameters of g() as variables and the model g() advantageously provides
the embedding of out-of-samples points. On the other hand, for manifold learning without model, Lt is optimized by
considering directly embedded representation A as the variable. To embed an out of sample point, a new optimization
has to be performed. In our work, we consider only manifold learning with model since the manifold attack, which is
presented in the next section, requires an explicit relation between the sample and its embedded representation.
3 Manifold attack
As in the classification task, the over-fitting problem can also happen in the manifold learning task: a sample which is
not in training set can be mapped to the wrong position in the embedded space. There is this famous example which
shows that a small amount of additive noise can get a learnt model to misclassify a panda by a gibbon [30]. This
means that the model, in this case, does not guarantee neighboring samples in the original space have similar embedded
representations.
We start with our definition for virtual point (virtual sample) and attack point. A virtual point is a supplement sample
(not data sample), which is crafted by user and is believed in the manifold of data. An example for virtual point is a data
point with a random noise. An attack point is a virtual point that aims to distort the model. An example for attack point
is a data point with an adversarial noise.
In the fashion of virtual adversarial training, we create and find attack points that distort the embedded manifold, i.e., to
maximize the loss function Lt while fixing the current model g(), then we update the model g() to minimize this loss
function while fixing the attack points. First of all, we define our virtual point and its feasible zone. Let consider p
anchor points z1, z2, ..., zp ∈ Rn, a virtual point x˜ ∈ Rn is defined as :
x˜ = γ1z1 + γ2z2 + ...+ γpzp,
subject to : γ1, γ2, .., γp ≥ 0,
γ1 + γ2 + ...+ γp = 1.
(1)
The anchor points zi define a region or feasible zone in which the virtual point x˜ must be located and γ = [γ1, γ2, .., γp]
is the coordinate of x˜. The anchor points, in general, are sampled from data X with different strategies. The strategy for
setting anchor points, is defined according to a user provided rule (see section 4, for several examples). The fig. 1 shows
an example for setting of anchor points and relations between points.
The algorithm 1 describes an individual manifold attack from a virtual point. Beside the embedding loss created by an
embedded data point g(xi) versus its counterparts :
Le(ai,Aci ) = Le
(
g(xi), {g(x1), .., g(xN )}\{g(xi)}
)
as mentioned in 2, we construct, in addition, the embedding loss created by an embedded virtual point versus embedded
data points :
Le(a˜,A) = Le
(
g(x˜), {g(x1), .., g(xN )}
)
where a˜ = g(x˜) is embedded representation of virtual point. The virtual point x˜ is initialized by γ then it becomes
attack point, in order to give a local maximum of Le.
We have that the number of virtual points depends on the number of sets of anchor points. A set of anchor points can
generate more than one virtual point by using different initialization of γ, to find different local maximums. Combining
the embedding losses from embedded data points versus their counterpart data points and the ones from embedded
virtual points versus embedded data points, we expect to regularize better the model g().
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Figure 1: An illustration about virtual point, anchor points. The three anchor points (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) are created as
zi = µ([x1,x2,x3]) + s(xi − µ([x1,x2,x3]), where µ([x1,x2,x3]) = x1+x2+x33 . The dotted lines represent the
feasible zone defined by anchor points zi, means that the virtual point x˜ is always inside this zone. The later is
controlled by the parameter s that allows to explore outside (s > 1) or to restrain strictly inside (0 > s > 1) of the
polytope defined by [x1,x2,x3]. The dashed lines represent the coordinates γ of x˜. The solid lines represent the
interaction of x˜ versus data points to create the embedding loss which is Le(g(x˜), {g(x1), g(x2), g(x3)}) in this
case.
Algorithm 1 Individual manifold attack
Require: Anchor points {z1, .., zp}, data points {x1, ..,xN}, embedding loss Le(), model g(), ξ, n_iters.
1: initialize : γ ∈ Rp, γ = [γ1, .., γp] for constraints in eq. (1)
2: x˜ = γ1z1 + γ2z2 + ...+ γpzp
3: for i = 1 to n_iters do
4: L = Le
(
g(x˜), {g(x1), .., g(xN )}
)
5: γ ← γ + ξ∇γL(x˜)
6: γ ← Πps(γ)
7: x˜ = γ1z1 + γ2z2 + ...+ γpzp
8: end for
9: Output : x˜
Finding virtual point x˜ is equivalent to finding γ with constrains as in eq. (1). The later is performed by a gradient-based
method. After updating γ by gradient, a projection is required to ensure the constraints for γ. This projection Πps is
defined as :
min
γ∈Rp
1
2
‖κ− γ‖22 ,
subject to : γ1, γ2, .., γp ≥ 0,
γ1 + γ2 + ...+ γp = c, (c > 0).
(2)
This convex problem with constraints can be solved quickly by a simple sequential projection that alternates between
sum constraint and positive constraint (algorithm 2). The demonstration can be inspired by the Lagrange multiplier
method. This algorithm can be extended for executing in parallel multiple virtual points at the same time (γ ∈ RM×p,
where M is the number of virtual points). An implementation of algorithm 2 can be found in section 6.
In algorithm 1, there are only interactions from a virtual point versus data points. We extend this case into the general
manifold attack (algorithm 3), in order to take into account all interactions between points, which can be both data
points or virtual points. From now, the role of virtual point is exactly as supplement data point. We denote B as a set
that contains all embedded points (both virtual and data). Bs is a random subset of B, in order to perform optimization
by batch. In each step, only virtual points of batch are learned to distort the manifold by maximizing the batch loss L.
The effect between virtual points and data points can be controlled via the subset Bs, by tuning the ratio between the
number of virtual points and the number of data points (removing a number of virtual points).
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Algorithm 2 Projection for positive and sum constraint Πps
Require: κ ∈ Rp, c = 1 (by default).
1: δ = (c−∑pi=1 κi)/p
2: γi ← γi + δ, ∀i = 1, .., p
3: while ∃i ∈ {1, .., p} : γi < 0 do
4: P = {i|γi > 0} and N = {i|γi < 0}
5: γi ← 0,∀i ∈ N
6: δ = (c−∑i∈P γi)/|P|
7: γi ← γi + δ, ∀i ∈ P
8: end while
9: Output : γ = [γ1, γ2, .., γp]
Algorithm 3 Manifold attack
Require: Data points {x1, ..,xN}, embedding loss Le(), model g(), ξ, n_iters, an anchor rule.
1: initialize : g()
2: Create M sets of anchor points {zk1 , .., zkp},∀k = 1, ..,M by the anchor rule
3: for epoch = 1 to n_epoch do
4: Initialize γk ∈ Rp for constraints in eq. (1)
5: x˜k = γk1z
k
1 + γ
k
2z
k
2 + ...+ γ
k
pz
k
p,∀k = 1, ..,M
6: Set B = {g(x˜1), .., g(x˜M )} ∩ {g(x1), .., g(xN )} and divide it into subsets Bs
7: for each Bs do
8: L =
∑
a∈Bs Le
(
a,Bs\{a}
)
9: Update {x˜i|g(x˜i) ∈ Bs} to maximize L by algorithm 4
10: Update g() to minimize L
11: end for
12: end for
13: Output : g()
algorithm 4 represents the update step for multiple virtual points. The gradient update for γ is the simplest version by
default and we can replace it by the other one in gradient-based family. Since the attack stage is executed a lot of times
(alternatively with updating model g()), we recommend to use n_iter that approximates to less than 5 iterations. In our
work, the attack is based on gradient-based method, therefore the embedding loss Le need to be continuous with respect
to γ. Nevertheless, in manifold learning field, there are several methods whose embedding loss is not continuous, for
example, LLE in section 2, the embedding loss takes into account the k nearest neighbors of a point. Imagine that
after a gradient update step in manifold attack, a virtual point changes several neighbors among its actual k nearest
neighbors, then the embedding loss for this virtual point takes into account new neighbors, which make it discontinuous.
To circumvent this problem, we try to keep the loss embedding continuous by several strategies :
- By the anchor rule. We set anchor points in order that a virtual point, which is inside the zone defined by
anchor points, does not change its k nearest neighbors.
- By reducing the gradient step ξ or the number of iterations n_iter, which restrains the movement of virtual
point.
- By selecting a small subset Bs or removing a number of virtual points to perform the attack while fixing other
virtual points.
- By updating γ only if embedding loss increases.
Moreover, for the contrastive loss in section 2, we can redefine the metric in , the metric dx() which outputs value as 0
or 1, can be replaced by dx(xi,xj) = exp
(−‖xi−xj‖22
2σ2i
)
to make embedding loss continuous.
Pairwise manifold learning
For some manifold learning methods as MDS or LE, the embedding loss Le can be decomposed into the sum of
elementary pairwise loss le :
Le(a,B) =
∑
b∈B
le(a,b)
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Algorithm 4 Virtual points update
Require: m sets of anchor points {zk1 , .., zkp}, γk, ∀k = 1, ..,m, loss L(), ξ, n_iters.
1: x˜k = γk1z
k
1 + γ
k
2z
k
2 + ...+ γ
k
pz
k
p,∀k = 1, ..,m
2: for i = 1 to n_iters do
3: Calculate gradient∇L (w.r.t [γ1, .., γm]) of function L(x˜1, .., x˜m)
4: [γ1, .., γm]← [γ1, .., γm] + ξ∇γL(x˜1, .., x˜m)
5: γk ← Πps(γk),∀k = 1, ..,m
6: x˜k = γk1z
k
1 + γ
k
2z
k
2 + ...+ γ
k
pz
k
p,∀k = 1, ..,m
7: end for
8: Output : x˜1, .., x˜m
Then the batch loss L (in algorithm 3) can be modified into :
L =
∑
a∈Bs
Le
(
a,Bs\{a}
)
=
∑
a∈Bs
∑
b∈Bs,b6=a
le(a,b)
By this modification, L can be decomposed into three parts :∑
a∈Bds
∑
b∈Bds ,b6=a
le(a,b) (data-data)
∑
a∈Bds
∑
b∈Bvs
le(a,b) (data-virtual)
∑
a∈Bvs
∑
b∈Bvs ,b6=a
le(a,b) (virtual-virtual),
where Bds and Bvs are respectively set that contains all embedded data points and all embedded virtual points of Bs.
In pairwise manifold learning, we can further control the effect between virtual points and data points, not only by
tuning the ratio between the number of virtual points and the number of data points in Bs, but also by attaching a
weight for each of three above parts. The attached weights favor the most for the case data-data, then data-virtual and
virtual-virtual. The effect between virtual points and data points is important because virtual points are assumed to be
in the manifold of data at the beginning, but they can go out the manifold of data in the attack stage (As in the case
Random anchors in section 4). The elementary pairwise loss le for each part is not required to be the same, for example,
we can use le in MDS for data-data and le in LE for data-virtual...
4 Settings of anchor points and initialization for virtual points
In this section, we provide two settings (or rules) of anchor points with its corresponding initialization. This setting
need to be taken carefully to guarantee that virtual points are always in the manifold of data in attack stage.
Neighbor anchors
: The first anchor point z1 is taken randomly from X , then the next (p− 1) anchor points z2, .., zp are taken as (p− 1)
nearest neighbor points of z1 in X (Euclidean metric by default). Here, we assume that a zone defined by a data
point and its neighbors is always in the manifold of data X . The number of anchors p need to be small compared to
the number of data points N . The initialization for virtual point can be set by taking γi ∼ U(0, 1),∀i = 1, .., p then
normalize to have
∑p
i=1 γi = 1.
Random anchors
: The second setting is inspired based on mix-up method [9]. p anchors are taken randomly from X and we take
γ ∼ Dirichlet(α1, .., αp). If αi  1,∀i = 1, .., p, the Dirichlet distribution returns γ where γi ≥ 0,
∑p
i=1 γi = 1
and especially, with a strong probability, there is a coefficient γk much greater than other ones. The later means that
virtual points are more probably in the neighborhood of a data point. Since the manifold attack try to find only local
maximum by gradient-based method, if ξ and n_iters are both small, we expect that virtual points in the attack stage
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do not move too far from their initiated position, then they are always in the manifold of data. Note that, in the case
αi = 1,∀i = 1, .., p, the Dirichlet distribution become the Uniform distribution.
To ensure that there is always a coefficient γk which is much greater than other ones, we can adjust one more constraint
for γ, as γk ≥ τ , and by taking τ close to 1. The constraints in eq. (1) become :
γ1, γ2, .., γp ≥ 0,
γ1 + γ2 + ...+ γp = 1,
γk ≥ τ, (τ < 1).
Then the projection in algorithm 2 need to be slightly modified to adapt this new constraint. We define the projection
γ = Π
′
ps(κ) as follow:
κ′ ← κ
κ′k ← κ′k − τ
γ ← Πps(κ′, c = 1− τ)
γk ← γk + τ
(3)
5 Numerical experiments
We organize this section as follows. First, we show the advantage of the manifold attack for embedding the S curve data
and Digit data, in the case of small amount of data. This experiment is performed with two manifold learning methods :
multidimensional scaling (MDS) and Laplacian eigenmaps (LE). In the second experiment, we convert mix-up method
into its attack version by adding a simple attack stage and show that the attack version is more robust against adversarial
examples. The data using in this experiment is ImageNet [31]. Finally, we convert Mix Match, a semi-supervised
method, into its attack version and show that the attack version helps also to improve the accuracy rate on CIFAR-10
[32] and SVHN dataset [33].
5.1 Manifold attack for embedded representation
Figure 2: Left : S curve data 1000 samples. Center : S curve data 50 samples. Right : Digit data.
The S curve data and Digit data are created by the module datasets in scikit-learn. The S curve data contains N = 1000
samples, each sample is 3-dimensional, as showed in fig. 2. The Digit data contains N = 1797 samples, each sample is
a 8× 8 image of a digit number. We expect to embed these data into 2-dimensional embedded representation. Each
data is separated into two sets : Ntr samples are randomly taken for training set and the Nte resting samples are for
testing set. We denote x as a sample, xtr as a training sample and xte as a testing sample. We perform four training
modes, which are described in table 1.
The evaluation loss, after optimizing model g(), is defined as :
Lev =
1
Nte
Nte∑
i=1
Le(g(xtei ), {g(xtej )|j 6= i})
Before going in the training process, we need to define the anchor rule, embedding loss Le and the model g().
Anchor rule : we perform two settings of anchor points:
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Mode Description of objective function
1. REF Manifold learning that takes into account both training and testing samples :
Ltr =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Le(g(xi), {g(xj)|j 6= i})
The result of this training mode is considered as “reference” in order to compare
to other training modes.
2. DD Manifold learning that takes only training data samples :
Ltr =
1
Ntr
Ntr∑
i=1
Le(g(xtri ), {g(xtrj )|j 6= i})
3. RV Random virtual, virtual points are only randomly initialized and without attack
stage (by setting n_iters = 0 in algorithm 4) :
Ltr =
1
|B|
∑
ai∈B
Le(ai,B\{ai}),
where B = {g(x˜1), .., g(x˜M )} ∩ {g(xtr1 ), .., g(xtrNtr )}.
4. MA Manifold attack, the same objective function as the previous case, except
n_iters 6= 0.
Table 1: Four training modes : REF (Reference), DD (Data-Data), RV (Random Virtual) and MA (Manifold Attack),
and their corresponding objective function.
• Neighbor anchors (NA) : A set of anchor points is composed by a training point with its 4 nearest neighbors.
In this case, we have M = Ntr sets of anchor points and p = 5. The coefficient γ is initialized by the Uniform
distribution.
• Random anchors (RA) : We take randomly 2 points among Ntr training points to create a set of anchor points.
In this case, we have M =
(
Ntr
2
)
sets of anchor points and p = 2. The coefficient γ is initialized by the
Dirichlet distribution with αi = 0.5,∀i = 1, .., p.
The embedding loss Le used are MDS method and LE method as described in section 2, with the metrics by default.
For similarity metric dx() in LE method, we take σ = 0.2 for S curve data and σ = 0.5 for Digit data.
The model g() used is a simple convolutional neural network, more details about its architecture can be found in
section 6. For LE method, we impose two supplement constraints, in particular to avoid that all embedded points
collapse into only one point :
E(Atr) = [E(Atr[1, :]), ..,E(Atr[d, :])]> = 0d
Σ(Atr,Atr) = Id
where d = 2 is the number of output dimensions, Atr = [atr1 , ..,a
tr
Ntr
] = [g(xtr1 ), .., g(x
tr
Ntr
)]. To adapt these
constraints, we adjust a normalization layer at the end of model g() : (g(x)− E(Atr))Σ−1(Atr,Atr), where Σ−1 is
performed by Cholesky decomposition.
In case of a few training samples, we fix Ntr = 100 for MDS method and Ntr = 50 for LE method. The effect between
virtual points and data points is controlled by the couple λ = (number of virtual points in Bs , number of data points in
Bs). We set λ = (2, 5) for MDS method and λ = (5, 10) for LE method. The gradient step ξ is tuned from {0.1, 1, 10}
and the number of iteration is fixed at n_iters = 1.
Since using manifold learning with model, the initialization of model g() has an important impact, especially in the
case of small amount of training data, we perform five different initialization of model for each method, the mean and
the standard deviation of evaluation loss Lev are reported in table 2. First, we see that using random virtual points as
supplement data points (RV) gives a better loss than using only data points (DD), this is evident since we use more
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samples to train the model. Second, using manifold attack (MA) gives a better loss than using random virtual (RV),
which shows the advantage of adversarial learning in general and our proposed approach in particular, to regularize the
model.
For the S curve data, initialization by Neighbors anchors gives a better result compared to initialization by Random
anchors. However, for the Digit data, initialization by Random anchors gives a better result. This is due to the fact
that in the S curve data, Neighbor Anchors covers better the manifold of data than Random Anchor. On the other
hand, in Digit data, Neighbor Anchors (by using Euclidean metric to determine nearest neighbors) can generate, with
greater probability, a virtual point that is not in the manifold of data. This leads to a greater evaluation loss compared to
Random Anchor.
The five embedded representations for testing sample of S curve data can be found in fig. 3 for MDS method and in
fig. 4 for LE method (in section 6).
S curve data Digit data
Mode / Method MDS LE MDS LE
REF 130.7± 24.74 0.399± 0.07 2015± 14 0.07± 0.002
DD 352.56± 119.19 1.21± 0.46 2409± 78 0.58± 0.07
RV (NA) 173.87± 9.38 0.59± 0.11 2395± 73 0.31± 0.03
MA (NA) 170.62± 5.89 0.55± 0.07 2362± 63 0.24± 0.03
RV (RA) 183.42± 18.13 0.65± 0.14 2342± 56 0.22± 0.03
MA (RA) 169.04± 5.30 0.63± 0.14 2331± 56 0.2± 0.02
Table 2: Evaluation loss Lev of two manifold learning methods MDS and LE, in four modes : REF, DD, RV, MA
and two initialization strategies : Neighbor Anchors (NA) and Random Anchors (RA).
5.2 Robustness to adversarial examples
In this subsection, we provide an attack version of supervised learning approach Mix-up [9] and study the robustness to
adversarial examples. Let yi (one hot vector) denote the label of xi, Nl denote the number of labelled samples, we
recall the empirical risk minimization (ERM) for the classical supervised case:
LERM =
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
Lc(g(xi), yi),
where Lc is usually the Cross Entropy function. In Mix-up method, we try to generate more labelled samples, by
combining linearly two random samples and their corresponding label. This linear combination is controlled by
γ = [γ1, γ2]. We recall the objective function in Mix-up method :
LMU =
1
N2l
Nl∑
i=1
Nl∑
j=1
Eγ1
[Lc(γ1xi + γ2xj , γ1yi + γ2yj)]
where: γ1 + γ2 = 1 and γ1 ∼ Beta(α, α)
In Mix-up attack, we add a simple attack stage after each sampling of γ from the Beta distribution, to find γ that gives
the greater loss LMU , before minimizing the model g(). The attack stage is performed by using algorithm 4 with loss L
here is a batch loss of LMU . As in Mix-up, the number of anchor points p equals to 2, we can express γ2 = 1− γ1,
then we need to deal with only one variable γ1 to maximize the batch loss L. The projection 2 for γ1 is now just the
clamping function, to make sure that γ1 is between 0 and 1. To be in the same configuration as Mix-up, in a batch, all
pairs of data samples are linearly combined by the same pair γ1, γ2.
We perform four supervised training methods: ERM, Mix-up, Mix-up attack and Cut-Mix [10] on ImageNet dataset
with the model ResNet-50 [6], which has about 25.7M trainable parameters. We use ImageNet downloader by [34] to
download about 1000 classes and 550 each class by Uniform Resource Locator (url). However, since a lot of urls do
not exist anymore, we have only 948 available classes that each class has 400 labelled training samples and 50 testing
samples to evaluate the trained model.
We evaluate the error rate for testing set at the end of each epoch. table 3 shows the best error rate (top-1 and top-5)
evaluated on testing set and adversarial examples. The later is created by Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [30],
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Method / Data evaluation Testing set Adversarial examples
Top-1 Top-5 Top-1 Top-5
ERM 33.84 12.46
Mix-up [9] 32.13 11.35 76.79 50.76
Mix-up Attack (1) (ξ = 0.1→ 0.01) 32.57 10.98 65.60 37.57
Mix-up Attack (2) (ξ = 0.01) 31.35 10.81 71.31 44.5
Cut-Mix [10] 30.94 10.41 81.24 58.72
Table 3: : ImageNet error rate (top-1 and top-5 in %) on testing set and on adversarial examples on different training
modes : ERM, Mix-Up, Mix-Up Attack and Cut-Mix.
on the trained model by ERM, with  = 0.05. In Mix-up Attack, n_iters is fixed at 1 and ξ is set up following two
configurations, (1) ξ is reduced linearly from 0.1 to 0.01 and (2) ξ is fixed at 0.01. Following the original article, α is
set at 0.2 for Mix-Up and Mix-up Attack and α = 1 for Cut-Mix. More details for hyper-parameters can be found in
section 6.
First, in Mix-up Attack (1) and (2), we see clearly the trade-off between error rate for testing set and error rate for
adversarial examples. If ξ takes a large value as in (1), the error rate for testing sample can be even worse than Mix-up
(without using attack stage) about 0.5%, but it gains more than 10% for the robustness against adversarial examples.
On the other hand, if ξ takes a smaller value as in (2), error rates for both testing sample and adversarial examples are
better than ones in Mix-Up, but it gains only about 5% for the robustness against adversarial examples. Second, Mix-up
Attack (2) provides a worse error rate than Cut-Mix, about 0.4 % in the case of testing sample, but it gains about 10%
in the case of adversarial examples. Therefore, we conclude that manifold attack not only improves accuracy rate on
testing set but also provide significantly robustness to model against adversarial examples.
Note that, in attack stage, the model g() need to be continuous. In the case of using neural network model with Dropout
layer, the active connections need to be fixed in an attack stage to guarantee that g() is continuous.
5.3 Semi-supervised manifold attack
In this subsection, we propose semi-supervised manifold attack, created by combining a supervised learning loss with
manifold attack loss. We denote and recall:
- f() the model complete, which outputs the class probability and g() a part of f() from the input to an
intermediate layer, which outputs embedded or latent representation.
- xl,xu a labelled sample and an unlabelled sample, respectively.
- Nl the number of labelled samples and Nu number of unlabelled samples, hence N = Nu +Nl.
- M the number of sets of anchor points, which is also number of virtual points.
- B = {g(x1), .., g(xN )} ∩ {g(x˜1), .., g(x˜M )} set that contains all embedded representation of data samples
and virtual points.
The objective function for semi supervised manifold attack is defined as follows :
L = Ls + λLu =
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
Lc(f(xli), yi) + λ
1
|B|
∑
ai∈B
Le(ai,B\{ai}) (4)
In the case if B contains only embedded representation of data samples, we have the objective function for semi
supervised embedding as described in [35]. The supervised loss is the ERM problem by default, but it can be Mix-up
loss. The objective function eq. (4) is optimized alternatively between attack stage (γ as variable) and model update
stage (model parameters as variable).
In this experiment, we convert Mix Match [36], a semi-supervised learning method, into its attack version. The explicit
form of Ls and Lu can be found in the Mix Match original paper. As in Mix-up Attack, in a training batch, we add an
attack stage after the sampling of γ to get Mix Match Attack. Note that, γ1 in Mix Match differs from the Mix-up as :
γ1 + γ2 = 1, γ1 ∼ Beta(α, α) and γ1 ≥ γ2
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Data Method / Test 1 2 3 4 Mean
CIFAR-10 Mix Match 10.62 12.72 12.02 15.26 12.65± 1.68
CIFAR-10 Mix Match Attack 8.84 10.46 10.09 12.89 10.57± 1.47
SVHN Mix Match 6.0925 6.73 7.802 7.37 7.0± 0.65
SVHN Mix Match Attack 5.07 5.93 5.42 5.47 5.47± 0.3
Table 4: : CIFAR-10 and SVHN Error rate in four different initialization. The number of labelled sample is fixed at
250, with Wide ResNet-28 model.
Then the projection for γ1 is now the clamping function between 0.5 and 1. In case of using separately two variables γ1
and γ2, we can use the projection Π
′
ps (3) in section 4. We reuse the implementation for Mix Match in Pytorch by Yui
[37] (with all hyper-parameters by default), then we add the attack stage, with the number of iterations n_iters = 1.
In each experiment, for both CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset, we divide the training set into three parts : labelled set,
unlabelled set and validation set. The number of validation samples is fixed at 5000, the number of labelled samples is
250, and the resting samples is for unlabelled set. We repeat the experiment four times, with different samplings of
labelled samples, unlabelled samples, validation samples and different initialization of model Wide ResNet-28 [38]
(about 1.47M trainable parameters). More details for hyper-parameters can be found in section 6.
The error rate on testing set, which corresponds to the best validation error rate, is reported in table 4, for both Mix
Match and Mix Match Attack. We see that Mix Match Attack improves the performance of Mix Match, about 1.5%
less on error rate. There is a difference between the error rate of Mix Match reproduced by our experiment and the one
reported from the original paper, which probably comes from the sampling of samples, the initialization of model, the
library used (Pytorch vs TensorFlow) and the way to report error rate (error rate associated to best validation error vs the
median error rate of the last 20 checkpoints). Note that, there are also other semi-supervised methods in Mix-up family
as : Real Mix [39], Re Mix Match [40] and we can also convert them to get their attack version, which is expected to
give a better performance.
The drawback of manifold attack, first, is the additional complexity on training stage to find the adversarial γ. Therefore,
n_iter need to be small. The second one is that virtual points or attack points can be out of the manifold of data,
therefore we can have a worse result than no using manifold attack. A technical note for manifold learning can be found
in section 6.
6 Conclusions
We have presented an “add-on” which can be easily integrated with the main objective function to create a Virtual
Adversarial Training process, by using the linear combination of data samples. Despite the simplicity, we found
that, through experiments, by using attack points as supplement data points in manifold learning, we gain a better
performance on the evaluation loss. Moreover, in classification, by converting an approach in the Mix family into
its attack version, we not only reduce significantly the error rate, but also gain significantly the robustness against
adversarial examples. Our future work will focus on semi supervised manifold attack (Equation 4).
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Appendix
Projection for sum and positive
Proof, by using Lagrange multiplier, problem 2 becomes:
min
γ,µ∈Rp,λ
1
2
p∑
i=1
‖κi − γi‖22 +λ(
p∑
i=1
γi − c) +
p∑
i=1
µiγi
subject to : µ1, µ2, .., µp ≤ 0
We solve the following system of equations:
γi − κi + λ+ µi = 0∑p
i=1 γi = c
µiγi = 0
µi ≤ 0
γi ≥ 0
⇔

λ = 1p (
∑p
i=1 κi −
∑p
i=1 µi − c)
γi = κi − 1p (
∑p
i=1 κi − c)− p−1p µi + 1p
∑
j 6=i µj∑p
i=1 γi = c
µiγi = 0
µi ≤ 0
γi ≥ 0
If κi − 1p (
∑p
i=1 κi − c) < 0, we infer that µi 6= 0 (because if µi = 0 then γi < 0). From µi 6= 0, we infer that γi = 0.
Let P = {i|κi − 1p (
∑p
i=1 κi − c) > 0} andN = {i|κi − 1p (
∑p
i=1 κi − c) < 0}. We find exactly the same problem as
before, but with only active index in the set P .
γi − κi + λ+ µi = 0,∀i ∈ P∑
i∈P γi = c
µiγi = 0,∀i ∈ P
µi ≤ 0,∀i ∈ P
γi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ P
Then we repeat until the constraint satisfaction for γ. Here is an implementation for multiple κ (κ ∈ RM×p) in pytorch.
d e f p r o x _ p o s i t i v e _ a n d _ s u m _ c o n s t r a i n t ( x , c ) :
" " " x i s 2−d i m e n s i o n a l a r r a y (M \ t i m e s p ) " " "
n = x . s i z e ( ) [ 1 ]
k = ( c − t o r c h . sum ( x , dim = 1 ) ) / f l o a t ( n )
x_0 = x + k [ : , None ]
w h i l e l e n ( t o r c h . where ( x_0 < 0 ) [ 0 ] ) != 0 :
i d x _ n e g a t i v e = t o r c h . where ( x_0 < 0)
x_0 [ i d x _ n e g a t i v e ] = 0 .
one = x_0 > 0
n_0 = one . sum ( dim =1)
k_0 =( c − t o r c h . sum ( x_0 , dim = 1 ) ) / n_0
x_0 = x_0 + k_0 [ : , None ] ∗ one
r e t u r n x_0
Manifold attack for embedded representation
Architecture of model g() (Pytorch style) used in section 5.1 :
- S curve data : Conv1d[1, 4, 2]→ ReLu→ Conv1d[4, 4, 2]→ ReLu→ Flatten→ Fc[4, 2].
- Digit data : Conv2d[1, 8, 3]→ ReLu→ Conv2d[8, 16, 3]→ ReLu→ Flatten→ Fc[64, 2].
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Optimizer : Stochastic gradient descent, with learning rate lr = 0.001 and momentum = 0.9. Learning rate is reduce by
lr = lr0.5 after each 10 epochs. The number of epochs is 40.
Figure 3: Five evaluations with different initialization of model for the S curve data, using manifold learning method
MDS with four modes : REF, DD, RV (NA), MA (NA). We see clearly the effect of Manifold Attack by the second
column. Thus, the embedded representation of Manifold Attack is more spread compared to Random Virtual.
Robustness to adversarial examples
Hyper-parameters : optimizer = Stochastic gradient descent, number of epochs = 300, learning rate = 0.1, momentum =
0.9, learning rate is reduce by lr = 0.1lr after each 75 epochs, batch size = 200, weight decay = 0.0001.
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Figure 4: Five evaluations with different initialization of model for the S curve data, using manifold learning method
LE with four modes : REF, DD, RV (NA), MA (NA). We see clearly the effect of Manifold Attack by the fourth
column, where the embedded representation shape of Manifold Attack is more similar to Reference than one of
Random Virtual.
Semi-supervised manifold attack
Hyper-parameters : optimizer = Adam, number of epochs = 1024, learning rate = 0.002, α = 0.75, batch size labelled =
batch size unlabelled = 64, T = 0.5 (in sharpening), λ = 75 (linearly ramp up from 0), EMA = 0.999 , error validation
after 1024 batchs.
To reproduce an experiment, we define function seed_ as:
d e f seed_ ( p ) :
" " " f o r r e p r o d u c t i v e " " "
t o r c h . manua l_seed ( p )
np . random . seed ( p )
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random . seed ( p )
i f t o r c h . cuda . i s _ a v a i l a b l e ( ) :
t o r c h . cuda . manua l_seed ( p )
t o r c h . backends . cudnn . d e t e r m i n i s t i c = True
t o r c h . backends . cudnn . benchmark = F a l s e
r e t u r n 0
The four experiment 1,2,3,4 in table 4 are launched with respectively seed_(0), seed_(1), seed_(2), seed_(3).
In Mix-up Attack, n_iters is fixed at 1. In dataset CIFAR-10, ξ starts at 0.1 and decreases linearly to 0.01 after 1024
epochs. In dataset SVHN, ξ starts at 0.1 and decreases linearly to 0.01 after 1024 epochs for seed_(0) and seed_(3); ξ
starts at 0.1 and decreases linearly to 0.001 after 1024 epochs for seed_(2); ξ starts at 0.01 and decreases linearly to
0.001 after 1024 epochs for seed_(1)
Technical notes
By using manifold learning, we analyse the supplement complexity via two factors : the gpu memory and the execution
time.
gpu memory : Denote M number of virtual points in a batch and p is the number of anchor points in a set, normally
in the attack stage, we need to reserve the memory for Nb × p samples. Maybe this is not a problem for datasets as
CIFAR-10 or SVHN (which has small size for a sample, about 32× 32× 3 pixels), but for large dataset as ImageNet,
each sample has about 224× 224× 3 pixels after cropping, this can make the run out of memory in gpu. A solution is
to use a system of index that connect (each time) p anchor points in a batch. Let consider the following problem for
calculating the gradient backward in attack stage, to update the coefficient γ :
∇γLt
({g(γk1zk1 + γk2zk2 + ..+ γppzkp)|k = 1, ..,M})
Then the memory needed to reserve anchor points is equivalent to M × p samples. If anchor points are sampled from
data samples, we denote :
- Xb ∈ RNb×K×H×W , input batch (images), where Nb is number of inputs in a batch, K,H,W are respectively
number of channel, height and width.
- M ∈ RNb×M , index matrix (or mask matrix) for M sets of anchor points. M[i, k] ={
1 if sample i of Xb is an anchor point in set k,
0 otherwise.
- Γ ∈ RNb×M , coefficients associated to each input (in a column), and M is the number of sets of anchor points.
Γ is initialized as follows : Γ = 0Nb×M , Γ[M[:, k], k] = γ
k, k = 1, ..,M .
The system of index for anchor points is performed by einsum function and by a mask matrix M. Then all virtual points
are inferred by :
einsum(“NbKHW,NbM →MKHW”,Xb,Γ)
Then we update Γ by the corresponding gradient by mask matrix M :
Γ← Γ +∇ΓLt(Γ) ◦M
Γ[M[:, k], k]← Πps(Γ[M[:, k], k]), k = 1, ..,M
In short, by using einsum function, the memory needed is reduced from M × p samples equivalent to Nb samples
equivalent (two supplement matrices Γ,M ∈ RNb×M are negligible compared to Nb samples equivalent). Not that,
usually M is approximated to Nb then, we reduce p times the memory needed.
execution time : In a batch training (no attack), execution time can be decomposed into : loading batch data time
(pre-processing included) and working time (loss calculating + gradient back propagation + model updating time).
When adding attack stage, via our experiments, the execution time becomes: loading batch data time + working time
× n_iters, with hypothesis that time for gradient back propagation is the most essential in working time. Therefore,
n_iters must take a small value.
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